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Alfred Mele here caps, or continues, an impressive sequence of well-argued monographs on 
connected topics by one that is commendably brief. It offers at once a reconsideration that 
touches on recent developments, and a summing-up that resumes past discussions. The result 
will be welcome, and can be widely recommended. It includes well-developed arguments against 
what can seem two plausible claims, that backsliding is always compulsive, and that one cannot 
be effectively motivated to adopt a strategy to weaken the force of what is currently one’s 
strongest motivation. Here I shall focus upon an issue that has become salient through the recent 
work of Richard Holton, notably in his Willing, Wanting, Waiting (OUP, 2009). ‘Backsliding’ is 
a good label, being at once idiomatic and free of associations. Yet what is the topic?  
 Familiar but less innocent alternatives are ‘akrasia’ and ‘weakness of will’. Writers who 
look back to Plato and Aristotle may well embrace the first, and be embarrassed by the second; 
for both of them lack a term for the will, and fail to focus upon intentions. Hence they conceive 
of a failure to stand by a decision as a failure to act upon a judgment of how best to act. It is 
within this tradition that Mele sums up his own conception as follows (118): ‘I have defined core 
weak-willed action as free, sane, intentional action that, as the nondepressed agent consciously 
recognizes at the time of action, is contrary to his better judgment, a judgment based on practical 
reasoning.’ But does assimilate two different things? Holton argues for a distinction between 
failure to act on judgment, which he terms ‘akrasia’, and failure to stand by a decision, which, 
with refinements that I shall come to, he terms ‘weakness of will’. Mele reminds us that he had 
made the substantive distinction already (16). There are evaluative commitments, and executive 
ones. If, in a kind of case that both he and Holton illustrate memorably, I think it best not to take 
a dive from the top board, and yet decide to do so, and then fail to do so out of funk, I act in 
accordance with judgment but out of weakness of will. This they broadly agree about; but Mele 
also counts as weakness of will a failure to form an intention that accords with one’s better 
judgment. 
 Who is right about the connotations of the phrase ‘weakness of will’? Holton claims to be 
respecting ‘our ordinary notion’ (2009: 94), and Mele accordingly appeals to surveys of 
philosophical novices. One may doubt how well these promise to resolve the issue. Compare J.L. 
Austin’s distinction, in ‘Three Ways of Spilling Ink’, between performing an act ‘deliberately’ or 
‘intentionally’. A questionnaire handed out on a Clapham omnibus, or in a first-year lecture, is 
unlikely to elicit anything like Austin’s finesse; and yet one may find it persuasive. It is 
important to distinguish between conceptions and concepts. It is hard enough to identify the first 
by circulating questionnaires, for the answers may be contaminated by implicit background 
assumptions; even where a conception is identified, it is unlikely to fix the exact connotations of 
the concept. Mele’s data are interesting, but in no way decisive. There is no shortcut here to 
doing philosophy, in the hope (however uncertain of fulfilment) that our understanding of the 
concept may be refined and not distorted by suggested analyses.  
 That was a point of terminology (though a significant one). More substantively in need of 
scrutiny is Mele’s conception of agents’ ‘better judgment, a judgment based on practical 
reasoning’. If their ‘better judgment’ is a judgment better than some other judgment of theirs that 
is worse, we may have Plato’s picture of a synchronous conflict of judgments; if it is their faculty 
of judgment operating optimally, it cannot be ‘based on’ reasoning, though it will reason. Yet 
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this may not differentiate it. As Aristotle is aware, even reliable judgments can be intuitive, and 
even akratic ends may feed into means-end reasoning. Can it really be the role of better 
judgment, in the faculty sense, to assess what is best, all things considered and all options 
weighed? Agents may reasonably have little confidence that they can identify that. (It might be 
best to drop everything, and change one’s life; who can tell?) So Mele is wise to allow a 
limitation: we may understand ‘best’ as ‘relativized to options envisioned by the agent’ (6). What 
commonly links these to motivation? As he well notes, it is all too easy to conceive of action 
contrary to judgment if one thinks of the judging as ‘a purely academic exercise that has no 
interesting connection to the agent’s motivational condition’ (24). Yet this easy possibility 
misses our target: ‘When an agent feels no pull at all toward the course of action he judges best, 
the claim that he displays weakness of will seems out of place’ (ibid.). One can go further: if I 
say to myself ‘I really ought to do so-and-so’, sincerely but irresolutely, and don’t even try, this 
is rather half-heartedness than weakness of will. What we plausibly need in addition, for that 
variety of weakness of will that is also akrasia, is ‘motivation to settle on what to do’ (64), and a 
lively concern, if the question is what it is best to do, ‘to do what it would be best to do’ (67). 
Supposing that agents define their options by reference to some end or ends, foregrounded or 
backgrounded, we should think of a reflective agent as concerned above all else to do what is 
best in relation to some set of ends, and deliberating with an eye to that. So long as this concern 
remains dominant, he can be expected to try to enact whatever way or means he identifies as 
best. 
 If this is right (and I have quoted from Mele things that suggest it), it has interesting 
implications. First, we need not follow him in imputing to agents a ‘default’ mechanism that 
leads them to act on judgment if nothing interferes (64-6); for what they are acting on are their 
own purposes. Secondly, a failure to act on judgment only counts as akratic if it is at the same 
time a weak-willed failure to pursue one’s own goals. I have already set aside indifference and 
half-heartedness. Different again is fickleness: an agent may capriciously forsake an end even as 
he forms a view of how best to achieve it. In cases of akrasia, he discards, or at least disregards, 
the intentions that initiated and focused his deliberations (or otherwise underlay his decision) not 
through losing or gaining reasons, nor through fickleness, but because he finds it too difficult or 
disagreeable to act on his conclusion. It is agreed that not all weakness of will is akrasia: when I 
fail out of funk to keep to what I knew to be a rash resolve to dive off the top board, I display 
weakness of will without akrasia. Yet if akrasia is to be distinguished from fickleness, and 
indifference, and half-heartedness, it may be that it must always involve weakness of will. 
 It is possible that, when half of Mele’s Florida freshmen identified weakness of will with 
‘doing something you believed or knew you shouldn’t do’, they were not disagreeing with those 
who opted, also or instead, for ‘doing something you decided or intended not to do’ (19), but 
assuming an orientation towards a goal that doing the act would frustrate. They are unlikely to 
have had in mind cases of complacent amoralism, or of ‘purely academic’ thinking, or even of 
idle aspiration. However, Holton is more restrictive: he holds that weakness of will involves an 
over-readiness to revise a resolution, i.e. an intention of a special kind ‘involving both an 
intention to engage in a certain action, and a further intention not to let that intention be 
deflected’ (2009: 11). This gives a clear sense to the phrase at the cost of restricting its 
application: there can be no weakness of will where the agent (whether innocently, thoughtlessly, 
or idly) forms no such ‘contrary inclination defeating intention’ (2009:77). It is implied that one 
cannot display weakness of will without an awareness of the danger of contrary inclinations, and 
the will-power to resolve to resist them. On this view, a demoralized agent who forms an 
3 
 
intention to achieve some goal, but adds no supplementary resolution, since he is aware that he is 
bad at keeping resolutions, will not count as acting out of weakness of will even if he discards 
his original intention not for some good reason, nor out of caprice, but in conflicted evasion of 
the difficult or disagreeable. And yet it is more plausibly a role of resolutions to make weakness 
of will less likely than to make it conceptually possible. 
 Such is the kind of reflection invited by Mele’s succinctly thought-provoking book. 
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